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THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS AND DOUBLE
STANDARDS OF BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT
Mike Koehler*
In recent years, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement has
become a top priority for the U.S. government, and government
enforcement officials have stated that “we in the United States are in a
unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption” and that FCPA
enforcement ensures not only that the United States “is on the right side of
history, but also that it has a hand in advancing that history.”1
However, the FCPA is not the only statute in the federal criminal code
concerning bribery. Rather, the FCPA was modeled in large part after the
U.S. domestic bribery statute, and when speaking of its FCPA enforcement
program, the government has recognized that it “could not be effective
abroad if we did not lead by example here at home.”2 Indeed, the policy
reasons motivating Congress to enact the FCPA—that corporate payments
were subverting the democratic process, undermining the integrity and
stability of government, and eroding public confidence in basic
institutions—apply with equal force to domestic bribery.
Against this backdrop, this Article explores through various case studies
and examples whether the United States’s crusade against bribery suffers
from uncomfortable truths and double standards. Through these case
* Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law; founder and editor of the
website “FCPA Professor” (www.fcpaprofessor.com); author of the book THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA (2014). The issues covered in this Article assume
the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA, FCPA enforcement
(including the role of the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission in
enforcing the FCPA), and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA scrutiny.
Interested readers can learn more about these topics and others by visiting Professor
Koehler’s website (http://www.fcpaprofessor.com), specifically the FCPA 101 page
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101). This Article is part of a symposium entitled
Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad held at Fordham University School of Law.
For an overview of the symposium, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword: Fighting
Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2015).
1. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice,
Address at the American Conference Institute’s 28th National Conference on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-lanny-breuer-speaks-american-conference-institute-s-28th [http://perma.cc/UYA4MLCJ].
2. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice,
Address at the Franz-Hermann Brüner Memorial Lecture at the World Bank (May 25, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110525.html [http://perma.cc/
B2VD-F42Q].
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studies and examples, readers can decide for themselves whether the U.S.
government “practices what it preaches” when it comes to the enforcement
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act3 (FCPA) enforcement has
become a top priority for the U.S. government. Government enforcement
officials have stated that “we in the United States are in a unique position to
spread the gospel of anti-corruption”4 and that FCPA enforcement ensures
not only that the United States “is on the right side of history, but also that it
has a hand in advancing that history.”5 However, the FCPA is not the only
statute in the federal criminal code concerning bribery. Rather the FCPA
was modeled in large part after the U.S. domestic bribery statute,6 and when
speaking of its FCPA enforcement program, the government has recognized
that it “could not be effective abroad if we did not lead by example here at
home.”7 To best assess whether the U.S. crusade against bribery suffers
from uncomfortable truths and double standards, Part I of this Article

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
Breuer, supra note 1.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
Breuer, supra note 2.
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highlights relevant background regarding the FCPA, including the policy
reasons motivating Congress to enact the FCPA.
Against this backdrop, Part II of this Article uses various case studies to
explore whether the U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from
uncomfortable truths. These uncomfortable truths include the following
examples: (i) how the U.S. government actively participated in bribery; (ii)
how the highest levels of the U.S. government knowingly engaged in and
supported private bribery; (iii) how the identity of the alleged bribe payer
influenced the U.S. government’s enforcement of bribery laws; (iv) the
subtle difference between U.S. government and private sector attempts to
influence foreign government action; and (v) how the U.S. government
employs overblown and inconsistent rhetoric regarding bribery
enforcement.
Part III of this Article explores through various case studies whether the
U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from double standards. These double
standards include: (i) a variety of direct and indirect corporate interactions
with U.S. political actors; (ii) corporate interaction with U.S. healthcare
providers; and (iii) corporate hiring practices.
Through these case studies and examples, readers can decide for
themselves whether the U.S. government “practices what it preaches”8
when it comes to enforcement of bribery laws and whether the United
States is indeed “in a unique position to spread the gospel of anticorruption.”9
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Prior to assessing whether the U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from
uncomfortable truths and double standards, it is first necessary to highlight
relevant background regarding the FCPA, including the policy reasons
motivating Congress to enact the FCPA.
In the mid-1970s, Congress journeyed into uncharted territory. After
more than two years of investigation, deliberation, and consideration of the
so-called foreign corporate payments problem, the FCPA emerged in
1977.10 The FCPA was a pioneering statute and the first law in the world
governing domestic business conduct with foreign government officials in
foreign markets.
As with most new laws, the FCPA did not appear out of thin air. Rather,
real events and real policy reasons motivated Congress to act and pass the
FCPA. Indeed, as relevant to the subject of this Article, discovery of the
so-called foreign corporate payments problem resulted in part from the
work of the Office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor.11 As noted in The
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and
8. See id.
9. Breuer, supra note 1.
10. For an overview of the FCPA’s extensive legislative history, see Mike Koehler, The
Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 980–1002 (2012).
11. See id. at 933.
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Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (“SEC Report”), a report
Congress relied upon in enacting the FCPA,
In 1973, as a result of the work of the [Watergate Prosecutor,] several
corporations and executive officers were charged with using corporate
funds for illegal domestic political contributions. The Commission
recognized that these activities involved matters of possible significance
to public investors, the nondisclosure of which might entail violations of
the federal securities laws. . . . These secret funds were used for a number
of purposes, including in some instances, questionable or illegal foreign
payments.12

Along with the SEC’s work, Senator Frank Church’s Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations (“Church Committee”) also helped shine a light
on questionable corporate conduct. In 1975, the Church Committee held
the first of several hearings generally dealing with U.S. corporate political
contributions to foreign governments. In opening the hearing, Senator
Church stated:
In the course of the Watergate Committee hearings and the
investigation by the Special Prosecutor, it became apparent that major
American corporations had made illegal political contributions in the
United States. More recently, the Securities Exchange Commission has
revealed that several multinational corporations had failed to report to
their shareholders millions of dollars of offshore payments in violation of
the Securities laws of the United States.13

In short, during Congress’s multi-year deliberation and consideration of
the foreign corporate payments problem, Congress was well aware that the
problem had domestic analogues.14
Of further relevance to the subject of this Article was the main
motivation of Congress in enacting the FCPA. As Senator Church stated:
Several oil companies testified before the subcommittee that they had
made huge political contributions in Italy and Korea, for example. They
claimed to be supporting the democratic forces who are friendly to foreign
capital in those countries, but in fact, they were subverting the basic
democratic processes of those two countries by making illegal
contributions and were, at the same time, providing the radical left with
its strongest election issue. The large and steady gains made by the
Italian Communist Party in recent elections are due in no small part to the
fact that it is believed to be the only non-corrupt political force in the

12. SEC, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 2–3 (1976), https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegal-corporate-payments-practices-1976.pdf [http://
perma.cc/QMM2-NV8J].
13. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Multinational Corps. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong. 1
(1975) (emphasis added).
14. See The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 1,
13 (1975). The SEC Chairman noted, “Similar payments, at the local level, anyway, are not
unknown in the United States.” Id. at 61.
AND
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country, while the other parties are seen as the handmaidens of foreign
and domestic financial interests.15

Representative John Moss likewise stated:
Business practices of these corporations abroad often impact directly on
U.S. foreign policy. Disclosures have shown that United Brands dealings
with a Honduran Government and Lockheed’s relationship with the Dutch
Crown, Italian political parties, and former key leaders of the ruling
Japanese party had an impact as great as the Department of State might
have had.
Surely the public expects more than to have foreign policy made in the
board rooms of United Brands or Lockheed. Not only is a publicly owned
corporation unaccountable to the public when it uses its assets to bribe
foreign governmental officials, but also it is unaccountable to its
shareholders, the ones to whom the assets belong.16

As highlighted by the above statements, Congress’s main motivation in
passing the FCPA was not an altruistic, post-Watergate morality mindset as
is often portrayed in connection with the FCPA’s enactment,17 but rather
selfish and political: congressional leaders wanted to make foreign
governments and foreign political parties accountable and answerable to the
U.S. government itself, as opposed to private enterprises because of
improper payments.
Against this backdrop, President Jimmy Carter signed the FCPA into law
in 1977. In pertinent part, President Carter’s signing statement noted:
During my campaign for the Presidency, I repeatedly stressed the need
for tough legislation to prohibit corporate bribery. [The FCPA] provides
that necessary sanction.
I share Congress [sic] belief that bribery is ethically repugnant and
competitively unnecessary. Corrupt practices between corporations and
public officials overseas undermine the integrity and stability of
governments and harm our relations with other countries. Recent
revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence
in our basic institutions.
This law makes corrupt payments to foreign officials illegal under
United States law.18

In recent years, FCPA enforcement has become a top priority of the U.S.
government. Indeed, of the nearly 900 federal statutes the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Criminal Division enforces, the FCPA is one of the DOJ’s
“top priorities,” and the DOJ has stated that its “focus and resolve in the

15. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the S. Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 9 (1975).
16. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot.
and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 152 (1976)
[hereinafter Foreign Payments Disclosure].
17. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery:
Moralism, Self-Interest, or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 497 (2012).
18. Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment
Disclosure Bill 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977).

530

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

FCPA area will not abate.”19 The DOJ has a specific FCPA Unit and in
2010 declared a “new era of FCPA enforcement,” emphasizing that “we are
Likewise, in 2010, the Securities and Exchange
here to stay.”20
Commission (SEC), which also enforces the FCPA as to publicly traded
companies and associated persons, created a specialized FCPA Unit (one of
only five specialized units at the SEC) and declared that the FCPA would
be a “vital part” of its overall enforcement program.21
In 2012, the DOJ escalated its rhetoric concerning FCPA enforcement
and stated:
[W]e in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of
anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery
laws more vigorously than we do. The Justice Department’s record of
accomplishment in this area is a signature achievement of ours . . . .22

During this new era of FCPA enforcement, those subject to the FCPA have
been frequently reminded that “robust FCPA enforcement has become part
of the fabric of the Justice Department” and that its “global anti-corruption
mission has seeped into the Criminal Division.”23 In the words of the DOJ,
FCPA enforcement is “our way of ensuring not only that the Justice
Department is on the right side of history, but also that it has a hand in
advancing that history.”24
Against the backdrop of a new era of FCPA enforcement and lofty
government rhetoric is the fact that the FCPA is not the only statute in the
federal criminal code concerning bribery. In fact, the 1977 FCPA was
modeled in large part after the U.S. domestic bribery statute passed in
1962.25
When speaking of its FCPA enforcement program, the DOJ has
recognized, at least rhetorically, that the United States “could not be
effective abroad if we did not lead by example here at home.”26 More
specifically, the DOJ stated:
[T]he bottom line is this: At home, we pursue corruption at every level.
This is important for our domestic stability—it strengthens the legitimacy
of our democratic institutions, and shows that no person here is above the
19. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice,
Address at the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress Best
Practices Forum (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongress10/
breuer_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DZF-FKKY].
20. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice,
Address at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks24th-national-conference-foreign-corrupt [http://perma.cc/HFM4-SLZM].
21. Cheryl J. Scarboro, Chief of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit, SEC, Remarks
at News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division (Jan. 13,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310newsconf.htm#scarboro [http://
perma.cc/YLM5-QN52].
22. See Breuer, supra note 1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
26. Breuer, supra note 2.
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law; and it is important for the work we do internationally—it shows the
global community that we practice what we preach.27

Borrowing from the DOJ’s verbiage, “the bottom line” appears to be this:
as highlighted in this Article through various case studies and examples, the
U.S. crusade against bribery suffers from several uncomfortable truths and
double standards. Through the various case studies and examples presented
in Part II, readers can decide for themselves whether the U.S. government
“practices what it preaches”28 when it comes to enforcement of bribery laws
and whether the U.S. is indeed “in a unique position to spread the gospel of
anti-corruption.”29
II. UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS REGARDING
THE U.S. CRUSADE AGAINST BRIBERY
There are several uncomfortable truths regarding the U.S. crusade against
bribery including the following: (i) how the U.S. government actively
participated in bribery; (ii) how the highest levels of the U.S. government
knowingly engaged in and supported private bribery; (iii) how the identity
of the alleged bribe payer influenced the U.S. government’s enforcement of
bribery laws; (iv) the subtle difference between U.S. government and
private sector attempts to influence foreign government action; and (v) how
the U.S. government employs overblown and inconsistent rhetoric
regarding bribery enforcement.
The above uncomfortable truths should cause pause and reflection about
whether the U.S. government does indeed “practice what it preaches”30
when it comes to enforcement of bribery laws and whether the United
States is indeed “in a unique position to spread the gospel of anticorruption.”31
A. The U.S. Government As an Active Participant in Bribery
In 2010, Bobby Elkin, Jr. pleaded guilty to a one-count criminal
information charging conspiracy to violate the FCPA for paying and
authorizing the payment of bribes to Kyrgyz officials in order to secure
business for his tobacco company employer.32 At sentencing, the DOJ
requested that U.S. District Court Judge Jackson Kiser (W.D. Va.) sentence
Elkin to thirty-eight months in federal prison.33 However, Judge Kiser saw

27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See Breuer, supra note 1.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, N.C. Businessman Pleads Guilty to Role in Foreign
Bribery Scheme (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-carolina-businessmanpleads-guilty-role-foreign-bribery-scheme [http://perma.cc/6L6K-A3UU].
33. Mike Koehler, Judge (Again) Significantly Rejects DOJ’s Recommendation in
Sentencing Bobby Elkins, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
judge-again-significantly-rejects-dojs-recommendation-in-sentencing-bobby-elkins [http://
perma.cc/D6C6-T6LB].
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shades of gray in conduct that the DOJ portrayed as black and white. Judge
Kiser noted it was not illegal for the CIA to routinely bribe Afghan
warlords, and, in the words of Judge Kiser, this parallel “sort of goes to the
morality of the situation” relevant to the DOJ’s prosecution of Elkin.34
Accordingly, Judge Kiser rejected the DOJ’s sentencing recommendation,
sentenced Elkins to probation, and waived the usual probation travel
restriction allowing Elkin to return to Kyrgyzstan and resume his job with
another tobacco company.35
Judge Kiser’s observation about U.S. government conduct in Afghanistan
was prescient. In 2013, a New York Times headline read “With Bags of
Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan.”36 The article stated:
For more than a decade, wads of American dollars packed into suitcases,
backpacks and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags have been dropped off
every month or so at the offices of Afghanistan’s president—courtesy of
the Central Intelligence Agency. All told, tens of millions of dollars have
flowed from the C.I.A. to the office of President Hamid Karzai, according
to current and former advisers to the Afghan leader. . . . The
C.I.A. . . . has long been known to support some relatives and close aides
of Mr. Karzai. But the new accounts of off-the-books cash delivered
directly to his office show payments on a vaster scale, and with a far
greater impact on everyday governing.37

The above example alone ought to cause pause and reflection regarding
whether the United States is truly in a “unique position to spread the gospel
of anti-corruption”38 or on the “right side of history.”39 Yet, as highlighted
below, U.S. government-sanctioned bribery with public funds is just one
example of an uncomfortable truth regarding the U.S. crusade against
bribery.
B. U.S. Government Knowledge and Support of Private Sector Bribery
One of the most troubling aspects of the foreign corporate payments
problem Congress learned of during the FCPA legislative process was that
certain parts of the U.S. government were participants in, or at least
enablers of, the very problem Congress was seeking to address. The
following exchange during a Senate hearing between Senator Jesse Helms
and Lockheed’s Chairman highlights this issue:
Senator HELMS. Do you feel that these bribes or whatever name may be
applied to them came as any surprise to the Government of the United
States, specifically of the State Department?
...

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Matthew Rosenberg, With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES (April 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/world/asia/cia-delivers-cashto-afghan-leaders-office.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& [http://perma.cc/HZ2T-KNPT].
37. Id.
38. See Breuer, supra note 1.
39. Id.
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[Lockheed Chairman.] I don’t believe they came as any surprise to the
State Department or to other branches of the U.S. Government.40

Senator Helms then directed the following statement to a State
Department official during the hearing:
I certainly don’t want to even have the appearance of badgering you, and I
don’t want to belabor the point, but I am somewhat mystified in the light
of all the reports that have come to me, sir, that apparently at the State
Department during all of these years when these things were alleged to
have occurred, that there was a complete “hear no evil and see no evil.”
Now, just tell me this one more time. Nobody at the State Department
ever dreamed anything of this sort was going on at any time?41

Similarly, congressional leaders also viewed the Defense Department as
being a participant in, or at an least enabler of, the very problem Congress
was seeking to address. Senator Proxmire noted during a Senate hearing:
One of the most disturbing aspects of this is the role the Defense
Department has played, especially with respect to defense contractors
who sold abroad. We have a document which indicates that at one point a
top official in the Defense Department had counseled defense contractors
on paying bribes and urged them to do so under circumstances where it
was necessary.42

This troubling aspect of bribery and corruption is not a historical relic,
but continues in the FCPA’s modern era and raises the following question:
Is it bribery if the conduct was engaged in with the knowledge and support
of the highest levels of the U.S. government?
Consider the case of James Giffen, who was criminally charged with
“making more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials
of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil
transactions, in which [various] American oil companies . . . acquired
valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan.”43 However, Giffen’s defense
was that his actions were made with the knowledge and support of the CIA,
the National Security Council, the State Department, and the White
House.44 The DOJ did not dispute that Giffen had frequent contacts with
senior U.S. intelligence officials or that he used his ties within the Kazakh
government to assist the United States. With the court’s approval, Giffen
40. Lockheed Bribery: Hearings Before the S. Comm on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong. 55 (1975).
41. Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Econ.
in Gov’t of the Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 167 (1976).
42. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 110 (1976) [hereinafter Foreign and Corporate Bribes].
43. Press Release, U.S. Att’y S. Dist. of N.Y., American Businessman Charged with $78
Million in Unlawful Payments to Kazakh Officials in 6 Oil Transactions; Former Mobil
Corp. Executive Indicted for Tax Evasion in Kickback Scheme (Apr. 2, 2003),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/04-0203williams-pressrelease-indict.pdf [http://perma.cc/7M2C-F6MY].
44. See Mike Koehler, The Giffen Gaffe—The Final Chapter, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov.
22, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-giffen-gaffe-the-final-chapter (containing links
to original source documents) [http://perma.cc/RT2K-FFEC].
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sought discovery from the U.S. government to support his public authority
defense and much of the delay in the case was due to the government’s
resistance to providing such discovery.
In 2010, approximately seven years after the enforcement action began,
the case took a sudden and mysterious turn when Giffen agreed to plead
guilty to a one-paragraph superseding indictment charging a misdemeanor
tax violation.45 Presiding Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of
New York imposed no jail time on Giffen and praised him for advancing
U.S. “strategic interests,” calling him a Cold War hero and commenting that
the enforcement action should never have been brought in the first place.46
Giffen himself stated: “Would I do it again? Absolutely. What we were
doing was important.”47
Giffen presumably prevailed over the DOJ not because of the facts or the
law, but because he possessed significant leverage over the U.S.
government. Indeed, a Foreign Policy columnist noted that Giffen’s legal
team “understood correctly that he could set up a collision between the
Justice Department and the CIA in which the latter would probably
prevail.”48 Likewise, a Harper’s Magazine columnist noted that the Giffen
enforcement action had “been the focus of political manipulation concerns
for years” and that the end of the case seemed to ratify that view and “[t]he
notion of an independent, politically insulated criminal-justice
administration in America [took] another severe hit.”49
The Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan provides another relevant example
when considering whether bribery occurs if the conduct was engaged in
with the knowledge and support of the highest levels of the U.S.
government. In 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing
concerning allegations of corruption in connection with U.S. fuel contracts
at Manas Air Base, a critical transit and resupply hub for U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan.50 The hearing focused on allegations that U.S.
contractors who supplied fuel to the air base had significant financial

45. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Giffen, No. S4 03-WHP-404 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
6, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/08-0610giffen-plea-agree.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XTP-6JLD].
46. David Glovin, Cold War Patriot Defense Helps Giffen Beat Bribe Case, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-16/cold-war-patriotdefense-helps-kazakh-go-between-beat-u-s-bribe-charges [http://perma.cc/DF8U-PP3R].
47. Id.
48. Steve Levine, James Giffen’s Trial Ends: A Slap on the Wrist, and the Triumph of
American Putinism, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 6, 2010), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/08/06/
james-giffens-trial-ends-a-slap-on-the-wrist-and-the-triumph-of-american-putinism/ [http://
perma.cc/NY2F-QTRP].
49. Scott Horton, Kazakhgate Ends with a Whimper, HARPER’S MAGAZINE (Aug. 9,
2010), http://harpers.org/blog/2010/08/kazakhgate-ends-with-a-whimper/ [http://perma.cc/
B6WA-3MAA].
50. See Crisis in Kyrgyzstan: Fuel, Contracts, and Revolution Along the Afghan Supply
Chain: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Crisis in Kyrgyzstan Hearing],
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg65551/html/CHRG-111hhrg65551.htm
[http://perma.cc/9FJG-B9BC].
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dealings with the family of deposed Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev.
In opening the hearing, Representative John Tierney stated:
[L]et’s be honest. At many times throughout our history, the United
States has closely dealt with unsavory regimes in order to achieve more
pressing policy or strategic objectives. That is realism in a nutshell. But
the United States also prides itself on a more enlightened view of our role
in the world and our long-term interests in universal respect for
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.
Some suggest that the United States has allowed strategic and logistical
expedience in Kyrgyzstan to become a lasting embrace of two corrupt and
authoritarian regimes. Regardless of U.S. intent, we are left with the fact
that both President Akayev and President Bakiyev were forcefully ousted
from office amid widespread public perceptions that the United States had
supported the regimes’ repression and fueled—I say that without any pun
intended—their corrosive corruption.51

During the hearing, witnesses informed the U.S. House of
Representatives of “numerous red flags of the sort traditionally used by
[the] Department of Justice when looking at bribery cases relating to public
contracts” and strongly suggesting that the conduct at Manas involved
FCPA violations.52
Specifically, the House learned how various contracts involving U.S.
business organizations Red Star and Mina Corp. were structured and how
these organizations received in excess of $1 billion in refuel supply
contracts.53 According to the testimony of Scott Horton (who was, among
other things, a member of the Board of the National Institute of Military
Justice and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations):
[There] are very disturbing questions concerning these companies. They
appear to have come out of nowhere with no prior track record of
involvement in this sector; the individuals involved with them have
copious connections to the U.S. Government, but not really very much to
the fuel supply industry; and the contracting relationships themselves are,
in a word, extraordinary, not consistent with traditional contracting rule
[sic] and approaches.54

Relevant to the Manas fuel contracts, the official FCPA Guidance
released by the government identifies the following red flags associated
with contracting: when a party “is in a different line of business than that
for which it has been engaged” and when a party “is related to or closely
associated” with government officials.55
At the hearing, Horton also testified about the alleged indifference of the
DOJ to the alleged corruption at Manas. Horton stated:

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 22 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/
2015/01/16/guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/2UK8-KXW3].
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I also am concerned about the role the U.S. Department of Justice has
played in this, because after the 2005 revolution, the Justice Department
did come in, did conduct an investigation, and appears to have given a
wink and a nod to these arrangements involving Red Star and Mina Corp.,
and I think that raises serious questions in my mind about their
understanding of this contract corruption issue, particularly because this
occurs at a time when our Justice Department is telling us that
procurement contract fraud is a priority for the Department of Justice.
Indeed, they say it is a national security issue. And I don’t see how we
can reconcile the way they have behaved in this case with those sorts of
statements.56

It was troubling in the mid-1970’s when Congress learned that certain
parts of the U.S. government were participants in, or at least enablers of, the
very problem Congress was seeking to address. As highlighted by the
Giffen and Manas examples, it is even more troubling that this problem
appears to persist today and that the U.S. government seems to condone
bribery when done with the approval or the wink and nod of one part of the
U.S. government.
As highlighted next, it is equally troubling that the identity of the alleged
bribe payer influenced the U.S. government’s enforcement of bribery laws.
C. Inconsistent U.S. Government Enforcement of Bribery Laws
Equal treatment and absence of discrimination are commonly accepted
rule of law principles. These fundamental principles are found in the
Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (“OECD Convention”) to which the United States is a party.57
Specifically, Article 5 of the OECD Convention states under the heading
“Enforcement” that prosecution of bribery offenses “shall not be influenced
by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon
relations with another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons
involved.”58
However, bribery by companies perceived to be otherwise vital to U.S.
strategic interests seemingly violate these rule of law principles in that such
companies were not charged with violating the FCPA’s antibribery
provisions in what can be called bribery, yet no bribery enforcement
actions. In addition to the above Giffen and Manas examples—which just
as easily could be highlighted in this section—this section examines an
enforcement action against BAE Systems.
For years, British defense contractor BAE Systems was under intense
scrutiny concerning allegations that it engaged in widespread bribery and
corruption, and in 2010, the DOJ filed a criminal information against
56. Crisis in Kyrgyzstan Hearing, supra note 50, at 44.
57. Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 5, Dec. 17,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
58. Id.
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BAE.59 Among other allegations, the DOJ alleged that BAE “provided
substantial benefits” to a Saudi Arabian official who was in a position of
influence regarding contracts for military aircraft and related services.60
According to the DOJ, BAE provided benefits worth millions of dollars
such as the purchase of travel and accommodations, securities services, real
estate, automobiles, and personal items through various payment
mechanisms both in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and
elsewhere.61
Despite the above allegations, the DOJ merely charged BAE with one
count of conspiracy for “making certain false, inaccurate and incomplete
statements to the U.S. government and failing to honor certain undertakings
given to the U.S. government, thereby defrauding the United States” and
“causing to be filed export license applications with [various U.S.
government entities] that omitted a material fact” concerning fee and
commission payments.62
In other words, BAE was not charged with FCPA antibribery violations
even though among the false statements BAE was alleged to have made to
the U.S. government was its commitment not to knowingly violate the
FCPA. This was the only mention of the FCPA in the criminal enforcement
action despite the above allegations that clearly implicated the FCPA’s
antibribery provisions.
A key factor the DOJ considered in resolving the case against BAE in the
way it did was the “collateral consequences” that could have resulted from
criminal antibribery charges including the risk of debarment and exclusion
from government contracts.63 BAE did plead guilty to the charged offenses
and agreed to pay a $400 million fine and thus clearly did not escape
liability for its egregious conduct.64 Yet, the lack of FCPA antibribery
violations against BAE was notable. However, BAE was no ordinary
company, but rather a major U.S. government contractor, and the DOJ
specifically noted in the charging documents that the company was the
largest defense contractor in Europe and the fifth largest in the United
States as measured by sales.65
In short, the uncomfortable truth of U.S. bribery enforcement is that
some of the most egregious FCPA violators, per the DOJ’s own allegations,
are also some of the largest and most important U.S. government

59. See Information, United States v. BAE Systems plc, No. 10-CR-035-JDB (D.D.C.
Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/
02-01-10baesystems-info.pdf [http://perma.cc/BS4N-CS3L].
60. Id. ¶ 43.
61. Id. ¶ 44.
62. Id. ¶ 5.
63. See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, BAE Systems, No. 10-CR-035-JDB,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/02-2210baesystems-memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/FUE9-XE6D].
64. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to
Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systemsplc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine [http://perma.cc/B88T-YPNY].
65. Information, supra note 59, ¶ 1.
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contractors or suppliers of goods and services critical to national security.
That such companies were not charged with FCPA antibribery violations
leaves the impression that certain companies that sell certain products or
services to certain customers are immune from FCPA charges.
Even more troubling, business seems to continue as usual despite
allegations of egregious bribery. For instance, in the immediate aftermath
of the BAE enforcement action, the FBI (the same agency that investigated
BAE’s conduct and issued a press release stating that “corporations and
individuals who conspire to defeat [competition] not only cause harm but
ultimately shake the public’s confidence in the entire system”) awarded the
company a $40 million contract.66
The public’s confidence in enforcement of bribery and corruption laws is
also shaken by the subtle difference between U.S. government and private
sector attempts to influence foreign government action.
D. The Subtle Difference Between U.S. Government
and Private Sector Attempts to Influence Foreign Government Action
Not all uncomfortable truths regarding the U.S. crusade against bribery
are as obvious as the U.S. government providing bags full of cash to foreign
government leaders, the highest levels of the U.S. government having
knowledge of and supporting private bribery, or the U.S. government not
charging strategically important companies with actual FCPA violations.
As the below examples demonstrate, the uncomfortable truth is sometimes a
bit more subtle.
For instance, during the sentencing of Nam Nguyen, who pleaded guilty
to violating the FCPA in connection with payments in Vietnam, the DOJ
called to the witness stand Brent Omdahl, the former U.S. commercial
attaché from Vietnam, who was asked to testify as to the “seriousness of the
offense as it impacts Vietnam.”67 In his testimony, Omdahl described both
how he oversaw a staff of about ten people to deliver services to American
companies to help them grow their exports and how he managed an
advocacy portfolio in Vietnam to assist U.S. companies in selling directly to
the Vietnamese government.68 Omdahl testified that his group “constantly
advise[d] companies on strategies to enter the market, to bid on government
contract [sic], [and] to win business.”69
Omdahl described Vietnam as a “‘corrupt country’ and the DOJ
presumably expected him to stay on message regarding how corruption in
Vietnam [was] not a victimless crime and to describe who suffers from
66. Mike Koehler, FBI Awards BAE $40 Million Contract, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 28,
2010) (quoting Shawn Henry, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field
Office), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fbi-awards-bae-40-million-contract (containing links
to original source documents) [http://perma.cc/52SF-HRTX].
67. See Mike Koehler, Is There a Difference?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 9, 2011) (quoting
sentencing transcript), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/is-there-a-difference (containing links
to original source documents) [http://perma.cc/S8GR-FXSW].
68. Id.
69. Id.
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corruption in Vietnam.”70 He did that, but Omdahl seemed to drift in his
testimony when he stated: “I make no bones about it. It’s very difficult to
do business in Vietnam. It’s not very transparent but American companies
are making money and there are a number of strategies that companies can
follow.”71 Omdahl was asked, “Is it possible to do business in Vietnam
without paying bribes[?]”72 He answered, “[I]t is,”73 and one of the
strategies he described was the following:
Often [obtaining Vietnamese government business] may require a
personal visit by the Ambassador or another high-ranking official to a
government official or an official of a state-run enterprise. It could take
the form of a letter from a high-ranking U.S. government official to
another official in the Vietnamese government or state-owned
enterprise.74

Omdahl then specifically talked about a $180 million commercial
satellite contract that a Vietnamese “major state-owned enterprise” (SOE)
awarded to a U.S. company.75 “According to [Omdahl], [the U.S.
company] (he described the company as ‘one of our clients’) ‘was in a
competitive position to provide a $180 million commercial satellite to one
of the major state-owned enterprises.’”76 At this point, the judge asked the
DOJ attorney, “[W]hat does this have to do with what you said you were
calling this witness to tell us about?”77 After an exchange between the
judge and the DOJ attorney, Omdahl finished his testimony by saying:
The bottom line is, we have been able to help companies work through.
In this particular case, a European country was offering payment with
regards to winning the bid but the intervention of the Ambassador with
the Chairman of [the SOE] and the Minister of Information
Communications, was a critical element to help the company win the
business, and they have stated as such.78

According to public records, Lockheed Martin was the company that
secured the $180 million contract in Vietnam and it is among the “biggest
corporate campaign contributors in U.S. politics.”79 Therefore, the
following questions arise: Is there a difference between: (a) when a
company (or its employees) give something of value to a foreign official to
obtain or retain business with a foreign government; and (b) when a
company (or its employees) give something of value to U.S. political parties
or candidates, or spends millions lobbying the U.S. government, and then
the U.S. government assists the company to obtain or retain business with a
foreign government?
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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Consider also U.S. diplomats who act as “marketing agents” for U.S.
companies and help broker sales with foreign governments. As detailed by
the New York Times:
The king of Saudi Arabia wanted the United States to outfit his personal
jet with the same high-tech devices as Air Force One. The president of
Turkey wanted the Obama administration to let a Turkish astronaut sit in
on a NASA space flight. And in Bangladesh, the prime minister pressed
the State Department to re-establish landing rights at Kennedy
International Airport in New York. Each of these government leaders had
one thing in common: they were trying to decide whether to buy billions
of dollars’ worth of commercial jets from [a U.S. company] or its
European competitor, Airbus. And United States diplomats were acting
like marketing agents, offering deals to heads of state and airline
executives whose decisions could be influenced by price, performance
and, as with all finicky customers with plenty to spend, perks. . . . To a
greater degree than previously known, diplomats are a big part of the sales
force, according to hundreds of cables released by WikiLeaks, which
describe politicking and cajoling at the highest levels.80

The above examples raise the question of whether there is a difference
between the U.S. government using public taxpayer money to offer or to
pay a foreign government to induce that government to purchase U.S.
company product and a company using private shareholder money to offer
or pay a foreign official to induce the government to purchase its product.
Similarly, why does the U.S. government construct programs around the
former and call it “foreign military financing” or “foreign military sales”
while criminally prosecuting the latter as bribery?81 As to these questions,
as others have noted, “the [U.S.] government wants to give the impression
that it is law-abiding and others are not when the same behavior is engaged
in” by both and that “when the government itself gives bribes to foreign
countries every day, every day of the week, they just call it foreign aid.”82
Do the above examples merely demonstrate that the dividing line
between bribery and no bribery is subtle and dependent on the source of the
money and influence? Indeed, it has been noted:
It’s not that the United States lacks corruption . . . or even pervasive
corruption. It’s just not of the low-level and petty variety like the kind [in
certain emerging markets in places like Africa], not most of the time

80. Eric Lipton, Diplomats Help Push Sales of Jetliners on the Global Market, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/business/03wikileaks-boeing.
html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/L64F-TV7X].
81. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Smith & Wesson with FCPA Violations
(July 28, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542
384677#.VOInmPnF91Y [http://perma.cc/AQ54-U9N8].
82. Repeal the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, FOX BUSINESS (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1612796235001/repeal-foreign-corrupt-practices-act/?#sp=
show-clips [http://perma.cc/34CM-AN59].
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anyway. In America, corruption is concentrated at the highest levels of
society—and it masquerades [under different names].83

Likewise, the subtle differences between foreign bribery and U.S. bribery
have been described as follows:
The idea of corruption . . . is simple bribery—cash changing hands. It’s
the proverbial cash in the piano or the freezer. Corruption is reduced to
bribery.
In fact, today’s most savvy power brokers are engaged in a kind of
corruption that is much more subtle and more difficult to detect. Today’s
most corrupt players, at least in the West, don’t need this quid pro quo
corruption. They are far beyond that. That’s for the little players. That’s
for the small fry.84

Bribery, however, ought to be bribery pure and simple, and subtle
distinctions should not be drawn based on the source of money or influence.
Doing so merely creates a distinction without a difference. Indeed, perhaps
because of this uncomfortable truth regarding the U.S. crusade against
bribery, U.S. government enforcement agencies frequently employ
overblown and inconsistent rhetoric when describing FCPA enforcement.
E. The U.S. Government’s Overblown and Inconsistent Rhetoric
Regarding Bribery Enforcement
While U.S. government agencies that enforce bribery laws appear to be
impartial law enforcement agencies, the fact is that such agencies—
particularly the DOJ—are also political actors advancing political interests.
As long as there has been government, government actors have used
rhetoric—no matter how off target—to advance political causes. As
highlighted below, a final uncomfortable truth regarding the U.S. crusade
against bribery is the often overblown and inconsistent rhetoric of the DOJ
in describing its FCPA enforcement program.
For instance, when describing its FCPA enforcement program, the DOJ
has frequently invoked the name of Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian man
whose act of self-immolation in the face of local corruption was generally
viewed as contributing to the Arab Spring. The DOJ has stated, “[T]hrough
our FCPA enforcement, we are also sending a signal to ordinary people—to
Mohammed Bouazizis across the globe—that we stand with you.”85
Surely there were many ordinary people impacted by the U.S.
government sanctioning, acquiescing, or not fully prosecuting the examples
of bribery highlighted above, yet the U.S. government seemed not “to
stand” with them. A recent Ninth Circuit case concerning a Board of
Immigration appeal is also relevant to the uncomfortable truth highlighted

83. Lawrence Weschler, America’s Pervasive Pay-Off System, SALON (Nov. 1, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/2011/11/01/america_corruption/ [http://perma.cc/6MSS-ZETK].
84. Janine Wedel on the New Corruption, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER (Jan. 21, 2015,
8:45 AM), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/janine-wedel-new-corruption/
[http://perma.cc/TCG5-7TTS].
85. Breuer, supra note 2.
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in this section. In a case concerning an Armenian citizen’s request for
asylum for exposing corruption, which the DOJ opposed, a judge
emphasized that the DOJ’s position in the case and other immigration cases
“clashe[d] with its own campaign against foreign corruption”86 and stated
“[i]t is unclear why the Justice Department champions the fight against
foreign corruption while it simultaneously tries to deport those perceived as
fighting foreign corruption.”87
Moreover, the DOJ frequently links FCPA enforcement to such classical
notions of bribery as roads not being built, schools lying in ruins, and basic
public services going unprovided.88 Such rhetoric certainly has a political
and populist appeal, and it is not difficult to construct various hypotheticals
in which bribery can lead to such broad-ranging effects.
However, the reality is that FCPA enforcement actions typically involve
companies that are widely viewed as industry leaders selling the best
product or service for the best price. Raising this common truth of FCPA
enforcement is not meant to suggest that industry leaders cannot violate the
FCPA—they surely can. Rather, this point is to highlight that a typical
FCPA enforcement action does not allege or even remotely suggest that the
product or service at issue was compromised, deficient, or capable of
causing the broad-ranging effects that the DOJ frequently highlights when
describing its FCPA enforcement program.
More recently, the DOJ has described its FCPA enforcement program as
“necessary” to protect U.S. national security interests. As stated by the
current DOJ Assistant Attorney General:
You may be asking yourself why the U.S. Justice Department is involved
in the fight against corruption abroad. . . . The threats posed to the United
States by international corruption, however, cannot be overlooked.
Foremost, corrupt countries are less safe. Corruption thwarts economic
development, traps entire populations in poverty, and leaves countries
without a credible justice system. Corrupt officials who put their personal
enrichment before the benefit of their citizenry create unstable countries.
And as we have seen time and again, unstable countries become the
breeding grounds and safe havens for terrorist groups and other criminals
who threaten the security of the United States. . . . For all of these
reasons, fighting foreign corruption is not a service we provide to the
global community, but rather a necessary enforcement action to protect
our own national security interests.89

86. Khudaverdyan v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2015) (Owens, J.,
concurring).
87. Id. at 1110.
88. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice,
Address at the 26th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html [http://
perma.cc/LJ7B-EC5K].
89. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice,
Address at Duke University School of Law (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-duke-university-school-law
[http://perma.cc/NR2S-SPSS].
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Surely terrorists and other criminals are corrupt, but it does not therefore
follow that enforcement of the FCPA is necessarily linked to U.S. national
security. Indeed, the vast majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions
are the result of corporate voluntary disclosures in which the DOJ and SEC
merely process the disclosures.90
Moreover, there is seemingly no credible and direct link between the
bulk of FCPA enforcement actions and U.S. national security interests. For
instance, in recent years approximately fifteen corporate FCPA enforcement
actions have concerned business relationships with foreign physicians, lab
personnel, and even a midwife based on the enforcement theory that such
foreign healthcare workers are “foreign officials” under the FCPA and thus
similar to Presidents and Prime Ministers.91 In addition, a substantial
percentage of FCPA enforcement actions concern alleged conduct in
connection with navigating foreign government bureaucracy in obtaining
foreign licenses, permits, and certifications.92 Moreover, several FCPA
enforcement actions have involved allegations about bottles of wine,
kitchen appliances, tea sets, karaoke bars, and flowers.93
Also relevant to the overblown rhetoric of linking FCPA enforcement to
national security is the fact that most corporate FCPA enforcement actions
concern conduct that allegedly occurred approximately five to seven years
prior to the enforcement action and, in certain cases, approximately ten to
twenty years prior to the enforcement action when U.S. national security
concerns were materially different.94
Not only is linking FCPA enforcement to national security overblown,
but perhaps most importantly, it is inconsistent with the FCPA’s actual
provisions. Indeed, as a matter of law, U.S. national security is a reason not
to enforce the FCPA.
The FCPA states:
90. See Mike Koehler, Voluntary Disclosure Statistics, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 10,
2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/voluntary-disclosure-statistics [http://perma.cc/8CZNTGXQ].
91. See Mike Koehler, The Origins and Prominence of a Theory, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Sep. 13, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-origins-and-prominence-of-a-theory
[http://perma.cc/2QEX-8RD5].
92. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907,
917–18 (2010) (categorizing enforcement actions concerning licenses, permits,
certifications, and the like).
93. See, e.g., Complaint at 7–8, SEC v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 12-cv-02045 (D.D.C. Dec.
20, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-273.pdf [http://
perma.cc/UL3T-W6PR].
94. For instance, an enforcement action against Hewlett-Packard-related entities
concerning conduct that occurred for seven to fourteen years in which alleged improper
payments were made in selling telecommunications, computer equipment, and other
technology products in Russia, Poland, and Mexico. See Cease-and-Desist Order, In re
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 71916 (SEC Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2014/34-71916.pdf [http://perma.cc/ND5F-RAB7]. An enforcement action against an Alcoa
entity concerning conduct that occurred for fifteen to twenty years in which alleged improper
payments were made in connection with an aluminum smelter project in Bahrain. See
Information at 8–10, United States v. Alcoa World Alumina, No. 14-CR-00007 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2014/01/15/0109-2014information.pdf [http://perma.cc/5YAF-FSRU].

544

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

With respect to matters concerning the national security of the United
States, no duty or liability under [certain FCPA provisions] shall be
imposed upon any person acting in cooperation with the head of any
Federal department or agency responsible for such matters if such act in
cooperation with such head of a department or agency was done upon the
specific, written directive of the head of such department or agency
pursuant to Presidential authority to issue such directives.95

Indeed, as highlighted above regarding the Giffen, Manas, and BAE
examples, U.S. national security seemed to be a reason not to enforce the
FCPA as a matter of practice.96
In short, whether it is the U.S. government being an active participant in
bribery, private bribery being engaged in with the knowledge and support
of the highest levels of the U.S. government, the U.S. government not
enforcing bribery laws against strategically important companies, the subtle
difference between U.S. government and private sector attempts to
influence foreign government action, or the U.S. government’s use of
overblown and inconsistent rhetoric regarding bribery enforcement, Part II
of this Article highlighted several uncomfortable truths regarding the U.S.
crusade against bribery. As highlighted in Part III below, the U.S. crusade
against bribery also suffers from several double standards.
III. THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT
The FCPA was modeled after the preexisting U.S. domestic bribery
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, and as mentioned above, the government has
recognized that it “could not be effective abroad if [it] did not lead by
example here at home.”97 As the table below shows, both statutes share
common core elements.
Core Elements
FCPA
Anything of Value
To a “Foreign Official”
To “Obtain or Retain Business”

Domestic Bribery Statute
Anything of Value
To a “Public Official”
To “Influence Any Official Act”

Despite such similarities, corporate interaction with “foreign officials”
seems to be subject to greater scrutiny and different standards of
enforcement than corporate interaction with similarly situated U.S. actors.
As discussed in this section, this double standard manifests itself in several
situations including: (i) a variety of direct and indirect corporate

95. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(A) (2012). That this provision specifically invokes the
FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions but not the FCPA’s antibribery
provisions would seem to be a scrivener’s error.
96. See supra notes 43–55 and accompanying text.
97. Breuer, supra note 2.
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interactions with U.S. political actors; (ii) corporate interaction with U.S.
healthcare providers; and (iii) corporate hiring practices.
A. Corporate Interaction with U.S. Political Actors
In recent years, there have been several FCPA enforcement actions
concerning corporate payments to foreign political parties and campaigns,
corporate lobbying of foreign governments, corporate interactions with
foreign law enforcement agencies, and corporate charitable giving.
For instance, several FCPA enforcement actions have alleged payments
to Nigerian political parties.98 Likewise, an FCPA enforcement action
against Titan Corporation concerned allegations that it made “payment of
more than $2 million, through an agent in the Republic of Benin, towards
the election campaign of Benin’s then-incumbent President.”99
Regarding corporate lobbying of foreign governments, Monsanto
resolved an FCPA enforcement action based on allegations that it “hired an
Indonesian consulting company” that provided things of value to an
Indonesian official to have the Indonesian government “amend or repeal the
requirement [in Indonesian law] for an environmental impact statement”
before authorizing the cultivation of genetically modified crops.100
As to corporate interactions with foreign law enforcement agencies, Pride
International resolved an FCPA enforcement action based on allegations
that company employees indirectly provided things of value to an Indian
administrative judicial tribunal judge “to secure a favorable judicial
decision for [a branch of a subsidiary] relating to a litigation matter pending
before the official.”101
Regarding corporate charitable giving, pharmaceutical companies
Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly both resolved FCPA enforcement actions
based on allegations that contributions were made to a bona fide Polish
foundation dedicated to restoring historic castles.102 Nevertheless, the

98. See, e.g., Information at 7–8, United States v. Bilfinger SE (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/12/12/bilfingerinformation.pdf [http://perma.cc/WVR5-SE65]; Information, United States v. Marubeni
Corp., No. 12-CR-022 (S.D. Tex. Jan 17, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/01/24/2012-01-17-marubeni-information.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
RFT2-ZUFH].
99. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Att’y for the S. Dist. of Cal. (Mar. 1, 2005),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-pr-plea.pdf [http://
perma.cc/FM8E-DUE9].
100. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Monsanto Company Charged with Bribing
Indonesian Government Official: Prosecution Deferred for Three Years (Jan. 6, 2005),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/January/05_crm_008.htm [http://perma.cc/63UP
-XES4].
101. Information at 14, United States v. Pride International Inc., No. 10-766 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/
16/11-04-10pride-intl-info.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4DU-UDX6].
102. Information at 4, SEC v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 12-cv-02045 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20,
2012), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-273.pdf [http://perma.
cc/JBL9-VVS2].
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government alleged that the foundation was “founded and administered”103
by the director of a government health fund who “exercised considerable
influence over which pharmaceutical products[,] local hospitals[,] and other
healthcare providers in the region purchased.”104 In a similar FCPA
enforcement action, the government alleged that Alstom violated the FCPA
by, among other things, making a $2.2 million payment to “a U.S.-based
Islamic education foundation associated with [an alleged ‘foreign official’
with decision-making responsibility].”105
Against this FCPA enforcement landscape, consider the following
examples:
i.

A President is actively seeking and accepting corporate money to
fund his inaugural festivities.

ii.

A high-profile corporate executive hosts a $40,000 per person
dinner that raises $15 million for the President and personally
writes a $2 million check to an organization that is supporting the
President.

iii.

Various companies make large donations—some in the millions
of dollars—to a family foundation of a high-ranking government
official whose office has substantial discretion over pending
transactions involving the companies.

iv.

A billionaire business executive bankrolls a high-ranking
politician’s campaign, finances the politician’s legislative
agenda, and subsidizes the politician’s personal finances.

v.

A pharmaceutical company faces pending government restraints
that could negatively affect its business. Thus, the company
turns to its lobbyists, who include former chiefs of staff to
various current government officials on a key congressional
committee. Furthermore, in recent years the company indirectly
has given thousands of dollars to current government officials
and otherwise made large donations to groups favored by current
government officials. Thereafter, the government officials insert
a paragraph into a massive spending bill that, while not

103. Complaint, supra note 93, at 3; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Eli Lilly and
Company with FCPA Violations (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/
Detail/PressRelease/1365171487116#.VOTt3PnF91Y [http://perma.cc/E6KC-KFJT].
104. Complaint, supra note 93, at 4; see Litigation Release No. 18740, SEC, SEC Files
Settled Enforcement Action Against Schering-Plough Corporation for Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Violations (June 9, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr18740.htm [http://perma.cc/EV5Q-6EGT].
105. Information at 23, United States v. Alstom S.A., No. 14-cr-00246-JBA (D. Conn.
Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alstomsa/DE-1-Information
-for-SA.pdf [http://perma.cc/P7LN-65L3].
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specifically mentioning the company, strongly favors one of the
company’s drugs. The effect of the paragraph in the bill gives
the company two additional years to sell the drug without
government price controls.
vi.

Various companies, facing various law enforcement
investigations, retain paid lobbyists to wine, dine, and make
substantial campaign contributions to the chief prosecutors
heading up the law enforcement investigations.

vii.

A company makes a $71,000 charitable donation to an
organization in which a public official in its jurisdiction is a
longtime board member. For each of the past five years, the
same company has given $25,000 to an institute named for the
late mother of another public official who chairs a key
congressional committee overseeing the company’s industry. In
the aggregate over a two-year period, the company gives
approximately $1.6 million to various charities affiliated with
lawmakers or executive branch officials. Over the same twoyear period, other companies in the same industry also have
given in the aggregate approximately $1.35 million to the same
public officials.

viii.

A company learns of potential legislation that will negatively
affect its business. Thus, a company representative begs a
government official who heads a key congressional committee
that will decide the fate of the legislation to vote in a way that
serves the company’s interest. The company also spends
millions to influence the legislative body. The government
official reverses his prior position and votes in a way that serves
the company’s interest. One month later, the company’s CEO
and the government official appear at an event where the
company announces it is making a $30 million charitable
donation—$11 million of which will benefit schools in the
government official’s district—the largest gift ever to the city’s
schools.

A prudent FCPA professional would likely see the red flags in all of the
above scenarios and counsel the companies at issue to conduct an internal
investigation of the underlying conduct. Indeed, the official FCPA
Guidance released by the government states as follows concerning gifts:
An improper benefit can take many forms. While cases often involve
payments of cash (sometimes in the guise of “consulting fees” or
“commissions” given through intermediaries), others have involved travel
expenses and expensive gifts. Like the domestic bribery statute, the
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FCPA does not contain a minimum threshold amount for corrupt gifts or
payments.106

The FCPA Guidance further states that companies “cannot use the
pretense of charitable contributions as a way to funnel bribes to government
officials.”107
But wait. The government officials in all of the above actual scenarios
were not “foreign officials”—they were U.S. government officials!
Example (i) describes President Barack Obama’s 2013 inaugural
festivities in which the President’s “finance team [offered] corporations and
other institutions that contribute $1 million exclusive access to an array of
inaugural festivities” with different packages offering “differ[ent] levels of
access depending on the level of contribution.”108
Example (ii) describes a movie company executive’s political
contributions and close ties to President Obama, including his hosting a
campaign event.109 According to the Wall Street Journal, the Executive’s
“fundraising prowess has earned him access and a role as the informal
liaison between Hollywood and the White House, as the industry continues
seeking government help against online piracy” among other issues.110 Of
particular note regarding this example, the movie executive’s company, like
other Hollywood studios, is currently the subject of FCPA scrutiny
concerning potential inappropriate payments and interactions with Chinese
government officials with discretion over aspects of the film industry.111
Example (iii) concerns allegations raised in a New York Times article
regarding former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and numerous donations
made to the Clinton Foundation by companies who sought approval from
the State Department concerning various business transactions.112
Example (iv) describes a billionaire’s relationship with U.S. Senator and
presidential candidate Marco Rubio. According to the New York Times:
[The billionaire] has left few corners of Mr. Rubio’s world untouched.
He hired Mr. Rubio, then a Senate candidate, as a lawyer; employed his
106. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC, supra note 55, at 14–15.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Sheryl Stolberg, For Corporate Donors, Inauguration Details, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/us/politics/obama-team-outlines-four-corporatedonor-packages-for-inauguration.html?_r=3& [http://perma.cc/2WE6-BJ4D].
109. Peter Nicholas and Erica Orden, Movie Mogul’s Starring Role in Raising Funds for
Obama, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390
443571904577630430778711196 [http://perma.cc/FG8A-W26H].
110. Id.
111. See Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-38 [http://perma.cc/R9GP-THPN].
112. Wilson Andrews, Donations to the Clinton Foundation, and a Russian Uranium
Takeover, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04
/23/us/clinton-foundation-donations-uranium-investors.html?_r=3 [http://perma.cc/KR2B24UC]; see also Michael Patrick Leahy, Legal Expert on Whether Donations to Clinton
Foundation Are Bribes: If It ‘Quacks Like a Duck, Chances Are It Is a Duck’, BREITBART
NEWS (May 29, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/05/29/legal-experton-whether-donations-to-clinton-foundation-are-bribes-of-hillary-if-it-quacks-like-a-duckchances-are-its-a-duck/ [http://perma.cc/6M28-E8MA].
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wife to advise the [the billionaire’s] family’s philanthropic foundation;
helped cover the cost of Mr. Rubio’s salary as an instructor at a Miami
college; and gave Mr. Rubio access to his private plane. The money has
flowed both ways. Mr. Rubio has steered taxpayer funds to [the
billionaire’s] favored causes, successfully pushing for an $80 million state
grant to finance a genomics center at a private university and securing $5
million for cancer research at a Miami institute for which [the billionaire]
is a major donor. Even in an era dominated by super-wealthy donors, [the
billionaire] stands out, given how integral he has been not only to Mr.
Rubio’s political aspirations but also to his personal finances. . . . Pressed
on his financial ties to [the billionaire], Mr. Rubio said in an interview
that he saw no ethical issue. “What is the conflict?” he asked. “I don’t
ever recall [the billionaire] ever asking for anything for himself.” He
acknowledged that [the billionaire] had approached him about state aid
for projects, such as funding for cancer research, but said that he had
supported the proposals on their merits.113

Example (v) describes the courting of various members of the Senate
Finance Committee by a biotechnology firm. According to the New York
Times, the company “which has a small army of 74 lobbyists in the capital,
was the only company to argue aggressively” for the legislative change.114
Example (vi) describes interactions of various companies with U.S. state
attorneys general.115 According to the New York Times, “Attorneys general
are now the object of aggressive pursuit by lobbyists and lawyers who use
campaign contributions, personal appeals at lavish corporate-sponsored
conferences and other means to push them to drop investigations, change
policies, negotiate favorable settlements or pressure federal regulators.”116
Example (vii) describes the charitable giving practice of a major U.S.
telecommunications company and other companies in the same industry.117
The Philadelphia Inquirer quoted the company spokesperson as saying “[i]t
is offensive to suggest our long-term support of community organizations is
in any way tied to governmental decisions.”118 The article further quoted
the U.S. public official whose late mother’s institute received the donation

113. Michael Barbaro and Steve Eder, Business Ties Made by Jeb Bush As Florida
Governor Turned Lucrative When He Left Office, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/business-ties-made-by-bush-as-florida-governorturned-lucrative-when-he-left-office.html?ref=business&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/B7T6-7NQ2].
114. Eric Lipton & Kevin Sack, Fiscal Footnote: Big Senate Gift to Drug Maker, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/us/medicare-pricing-delay-ispolitical-win-for-amgen-drug-maker.html [http://perma.cc/M3HU-W387].
115. Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-attorneysgeneral.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&region
=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/6HUG-89VH].
116. Id.
117. Jonathan Tamari, Comcast’s Charity Extends to Friends and Potential Foes, PHILA.
INQUIRER (July 29, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-07-29/news/52144872_1_comcastfoundation-sena-fitzmaurice-comcast-officials [http://perma.cc/Z86Q-HHX3].
118. Id.
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as saying, “You don’t seek . . . . If you’re in a position like I am, you
sometimes get.”119
Example (viii) describes a U.S. company’s potential tax exposure and its
interactions with a U.S. public official and his district.120 The New York
Times quoted a company spokesperson who said that the donation “was
granted solely on the merit of the project.”121 For his part, the U.S. public
official, who was previously censured “for soliciting donations from
corporations and executives with business before his committee,” said “that
the donation was unrelated to his official actions.”122
If any of the above scenarios involved “foreign officials,” there would
likely be an FCPA investigation of the companies involved. However,
because the above scenarios involved U.S. officials, there is a slim chance
that the government will investigate any of the above companies though the
domestic bribery statute has core elements similar to the FCPA.
But the question is why? Some might be inclined to say that while our
system is not perfect, that is just how the system works. But why should
the government subject business interactions with “foreign officials” to
different standards than business interactions with U.S. officials? Why do
we reflexively label a “foreign official” who receives “things of value”
from private business interests as corrupt, yet generally turn a blind eye
when it happens here at home? Is the FCPA enforced too aggressively or is
enforcement of the U.S. domestic bribery statute too lax? Ought not there
be some consistency between enforcement of the FCPA and the domestic
bribery statute?
Indeed, as relevant to the Hillary Clinton example above,123 Secretary of
State Clinton remarked:
[T]his Administration, like those before us, has taken a strong stand when
it comes to American companies bribing foreign officials. We are
unequivocally opposed to weakening the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
We don’t need to lower our standards. We need to work with other
countries to raise theirs.124

While pondering these questions, consider that the U.S. Supreme Court
has specifically endorsed the legality of the conduct highlighted in several
of the U.S. examples above. In both Citizens United v. FEC125 and
McCutcheon v. FEC126 (cases dealing with various aspects of campaign
finance laws), the Supreme Court stated: “Ingratiation and access . . . are
119. Id.
120. David Kociensiewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html?hp=&
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XL6S-B7RP].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Transparency International-USA’s
Annual Integrity Award Dinner (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/03/186703.htm [http://perma.cc/5U4E-82TP].
125. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
126. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).

2015] UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS AND DOUBLE STANDARDS

551

not corruption.”127 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit recently stated the following
about corporate lobbying:
Lobbying has been integral to the American political system since its
very inception. . . .
In order to more effectively communicate their clients’ policy goals,
lobbyists often seek to cultivate personal relationships with public
officials. This involves not only making campaign contributions, but
sometimes also hosting events or providing gifts of value such as drinks,
meals, and tickets to sporting events and concerts.128

However, it is difficult to square the above judicial logic with the
allegations in the above FCPA enforcement actions which do equate
“ingratiation and access,” with a certain type of public official, or providing
various things of value to a certain type of public official, as corruption.
Indeed, President Jimmy Carter recently termed unchecked political
contributions in the United States as “legal bribery of candidates.”129
Recall that President Carter signed the FCPA into law in 1977 and was
praised for doing so. Why should our reaction to President Carter speaking
out about another form of bribery today be any different?
At the very least, the actual U.S. scenarios highlighted above should
cause us to pause and reflect whether, in the words of the DOJ, “we in the
United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anticorruption”130 or on the “right side of history.”131
B. Corporate Interaction with U.S. Healthcare Providers
As highlighted in Part II, Congress’s main motivation in passing the
FCPA was the foreign policy implications of corporate payments to
government officials such as the Prime Minister of Japan, the President of
the Republic of Korea, the President of Honduras, the President of Gabon,
and Italian political parties.132
However, the alleged “foreign officials” in several recent FCPA
enforcement actions bear little resemblance to government officials.
Rather, the alleged “foreign officials” are physicians, nurses, lab personnel,
and others associated with various foreign healthcare systems that are
allegedly state owned or state controlled.133 This enforcement theory was
first used in an FCPA enforcement action in 2002 and has since become a
dominant theory used, in whole or in part, in approximately fifteen
127. Id. at 1441 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360).
128. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
129. Ray Henry, Jimmy Carter: Unchecked Political Contributions Are ‘Legal Bribery’,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/jimmycarter-bribery_n_3611882.html [http://perma.cc/JDW4-MXKR].
130. See Breuer, supra note 1.
131. Id.
132. See Koehler, supra note 10, at 934–35.
133. See Koehler, supra note 91; Mike Koehler, As Foreign Scrutiny Grows, Dollars
Continue to Flow in the U.S., FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.
com/as-foreign-scrutiny-grows-dollars-continue-to-flow-in-the-u-s [http://perma.cc/YKM7KQEB].
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corporate FCPA enforcement actions.134 For instance, the following
actions included allegations that a company subject to the FCPA provided
various things of value to such alleged “foreign officials”:


An enforcement action against Biomet, Inc. included allegations
that the company paid royalties to Argentine physicians and for
travel of Chinese physicians.135



An enforcement action against Orthofix International N.V.
included allegations that the company provided various gifts such
as vacation packages, televisions, and laptops to Mexican
healthcare workers.136



An enforcement action against Eli Lilly Co. included allegations
that the company provided various gifts such as meals, wine,
visits to bath houses, card games, specialty foods, door prizes,
spa treatments, cigarettes, and visits to karaoke bars to Chinese
physicians.137



An enforcement action against Stryker Corp. included allegations
that the company provided travel benefits to Polish and
Romanian physicians.138



An enforcement action against Pfizer Inc. included allegations
that the company provided travel benefits to Croatian physicians;
hospitality, gifts, and support for international travel to Chinese
physicians; international travel and recreational opportunities to
Czech physicians; and gifts and support for domestic and
international travel to Italian physicians.139

134. Id.
135. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Biomet, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-biomet (containing links to original source
documents) [http://perma.cc/MYS8-8K4U].
136. See Mike Koehler, Orthofix International Resolves Enforcement Action Based on the
Conduct of Its Mexican Subsidiary, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 12, 2012), http://www.
fcpaprofessor.com/orthofix-international-resolves-enforcement-action-based-on-theconduct-of-its-mexican-subsidiary (containing links to original source documents) [http://
perma.cc/U44H-EJPZ].
137. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Eli Lilly, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 27, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-eli-lilly (containing links to original source
documents) [http://perma.cc/T9PH-4FLW].
138. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Stryker, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-stryker (containing links to original source
documents) [http://perma.cc/5EZD-ALRM].
139. See Mike Koehler, Next Up—Pfizer, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 8, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/next-up-pfizer (containing links to original source
documents) [http://perma.cc/H8DA-TGEZ].
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An enforcement action against Johnson & Johnson included
allegations that the company provided travel to medical
conventions for Polish physicians as well as travel and other gifts
to Romanian physicians.140

Largely because of the prominent use of nonprosecution agreements
(NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) in resolving corporate
FCPA enforcement actions, the above theory that various foreign healthcare
workers are “foreign officials” under the FCPA has never been subjected to
judicial scrutiny.141 Perhaps most telling as to its validity, the DOJ has
never charged an individual based on this FCPA enforcement theory.142
In addition to numerous actual FCPA enforcement actions, the theory
that physicians, nurses, lab personnel, and others associated with foreign
healthcare systems are “foreign officials” under the FCPA is also the reason
why several additional companies are the subject of ongoing FCPA
scrutiny.143
Yet as this foreign scrutiny of pharmaceutical and other healthcare
related companies continues, the dollars continue to flow to physicians and
others associated with U.S. healthcare systems. For instance, in 2014 the
Wall Street Journal published a series of articles based on information from
a new federal government transparency initiative mandated in the 2010
Affordable Care Act that required manufacturers of drugs and medical
devices to disclose the payments they make to physicians and teaching
hospitals every year.144 One article reported:
The payments and so-called transfers of value to an estimated 546,000
doctors and 1,360 teaching hospitals include such items as free meals that
company sales representatives bring to physicians’ offices, fees paid to
doctors to speak about a company’s drug to other doctors at restaurants,
compensation for clinical trial research and consulting fees.
Some doctors have earned tens of thousands of dollars annually from
drug companies by flying to various cities to give paid speeches, while

140. See Mike Koehler, Johnson & Johnson Enforcement Action Focuses on Health Care
Providers As “Foreign Officials”, FCPA PROFESSOR (April 11, 2011), http://www.
fcpaprofessor.com/johnson-johnson-enforcement-action-focuses-on-health-care-providersas-foreign-officials (containing links to original source documents) [http://perma.cc/LQT3WRUU].
141. To learn more about NPAs and DPAs and how these agreements are the dominant
way in which the DOJ resolves corporate FCPA enforcement actions, see Koehler, supra
note 92.
142. See Koehler, supra note 91.
143. See Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-139 [http://perma.cc/5L4H-RF6L].
144. Peter Loftus, Doctors Net Billions From Drug Firms, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 30,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-agency-reveals-drug-makers-payments-to-doctors1412100323 [http://perma.cc/95ZU-SWCM]; Jeanne Whalen, Joseph Walker & Jonathan
Rockoff, Payments Reveal Range of Doctors’ Ties with Industry, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 1,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/payments-show-range-of-doctors-ties-with-industry1412208328 [http://perma.cc/S9NQ-KUE6].
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some surgeons received even larger amounts from medical-device makers,
partly from royalties on products they helped develop.145

Another article reported:
Drug and medical-device makers paid $6.49 billion to U.S. doctors and
teaching hospitals during 2014, according to the federal government’s
first full-year accounting of the breadth of industry financial ties with
medical providers.
The tally comprises company payments to more than 600,000 doctors
and 1,100 hospitals for services such as consulting, research and
promotional speeches about drugs, as well as the value of free meals
provided to doctors by sales reps pitching products. . . . Payments for
food, beverages, travel and lodging amounted to $403.64 million, the vast
majority of it in in-kind payments. Details of some payments for
miscellaneous “entertainment” included a $65 massage at an airport,
Alcatraz tickets and a $2,000 payment for a training seminar in the
Cayman Islands.146

Things of value are also being provided to U.S. physicians and others
associated with U.S. healthcare systems in connection with specific
contemplated business transactions. For instance:
As it fights to buy Botox maker Allergan Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International Inc. is investing cash and time wooing the doctors it would
need on its side after a takeover.
A centerpiece of the effort: Valeant said it met with a total of 45
influential cosmetic surgeons and dermatologists in September at events
in Aspen, Colo., and Palm Beach, Fla. Valeant paid for the physicians’
airfares, two-night stays at luxury hotels and meals. The company also
agreed to provide consulting fees that could amount to as much as
$30,000, according to doctors who attended the meetings.147

Many of the above things of value provided to U.S. physicians are
obviously similar to those alleged in FCPA enforcement actions involving
foreign physicians and other healthcare personnel. So what’s the difference
between the U.S. conduct and the foreign conduct alleged in several FCPA
enforcement actions? If the answer is that the FCPA enforcement actions
involved “foreign officials,” this is correct to the extent the government
alleged that physicians and other healthcare workers of various foreign
healthcare systems were “foreign officials” even though there is seemingly
no legal support for this position. However, given that approximately 20
percent of hospitals in the United States are owned by state or local

145. Loftus, supra note 144.
146. Peter Loftus & Joseph Walker, Drug and Medical-Device Makers Paid $6.49 Billion
to Doctors, Hospitals in 2014, WALL STREET J. (June 30, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/drug-and-medical-device-makers-paid-6-49-billion-to-doctors-hospitals-in-20141435694053 [http://perma.cc/8NYA-Z4GX].
147. Jonathon Rockoff, Valeant, Allergan Scuffle for Doctors, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 12,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/valeant-allergan-fight-for-doctors-1415839398 [http://
perma.cc/5FD3-A6TF].
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government,148 and that an additional 150 medical centers are operated by
the Veterans Health Administration,149 it stands to reason that certain things
of value provided to U.S. physicians are to individuals associated with U.S.
government-owned or -controlled hospitals.
Yet again one should not hold their breath waiting for enforcement
actions under the domestic bribery statute concerning the U.S. payments.
Again, the question is why? Assuming that foreign physicians and
healthcare personnel are indeed “foreign officials” under the FCPA, why
should corporate interaction with such “foreign officials” be subject to
greater scrutiny and different standards of enforcement than corporate
interaction with similarly situated U.S. parties? Indeed, in the minds of
some, “the most corrupt health system globally is that in the [United
States].”150 Relevant to the double standard issue highlighted in this
section, it has been asked whether the United States should “be policing
health care overseas under the guise of the ‘foreign official’ enforcement
theory,” or should the United States be “policing it by redefining how
businesses operate in the [United States] as a starting point and then
applying those standards overseas?”151
The double standard of bribery enforcement manifests itself not only
through corporate interaction with U.S. political actors and healthcare
providers, but also in connection with corporate hiring practices as
highlighted in the next section.
C. Corporate Hiring Practices
As long as there have been public officials, the children of officials have
often been valued by private sector employers. This dynamic is present
both in the United States and abroad. However, while the former seems to
be accepted, recent events have indicated that the latter is often investigated
as bribery.
For instance, in August 2013 the New York Times reported that “[f]ederal
authorities have opened a bribery investigation into whether JPMorgan
Chase hired the children of powerful Chinese officials [so-called
princelings] to help the bank win lucrative business . . . .”152 As stated in
the article:
148. See Hospitals by Ownership Type, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/
other/state-indicator/hospitals-by-ownership/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
GCE2-HVMU].
149. See Veterans Health Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.
va.gov/health/findcare.asp (last updated May 11, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SWJ3-BRKK].
150. Guest Post by a Fraud Investigator in the United Kingdom, The Most Corrupt Health
System Globally Is That in the US. Unfortunately It Is Also the Most Influential Medical
System, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 21, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-most-corrupthealth-system-globally-is-that-in-the-us-unfortunately-it-is-also-the-most-influentialmedical-system [http://perma.cc/7GDT-JBYV].
151. Id.
152. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess & David Barboza, Hiring in China by
JPMorgan Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/08/17/hiring-in-china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny/?hp&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/QL63CNMX].
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In one instance, the bank hired the son of a former Chinese banking
regulator who is now the chairman of the China Everbright Group, a statecontrolled financial conglomerate . . . . After the chairman’s son came on
board, JPMorgan secured multiple coveted assignments from the Chinese
conglomerate, including advising a subsidiary of the company on a stock
offering, records show.
The Hong Kong office of JPMorgan also hired the daughter of a
Chinese railway official. That official was later detained on accusations
of doling out government contracts in exchange for cash bribes, the
government document and public records show.
The former official’s daughter came to JPMorgan at an opportune time
for the New York-based bank: The China Railway Group, a statecontrolled construction company that builds railways for the Chinese
government, was in the process of selecting JPMorgan to advise on its
plans to become a public company, a common move in China for
businesses affiliated with the government.153

The U.S. government investigation of JPMorgan soon expanded to
countries across Asia and involved scrutinizing not only full-time workers,
but also company interns.154 As often is the case in the FCPA context when
one company is under investigation, U.S. authorities soon began an industry
sweep of other financial services companies and their hiring practices in
Asia.155 Among the other banks publicly reported to be under FCPA
scrutiny are: Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Citigroup Inc., Credit
Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan
Stanley, and UBS AG.156
The FCPA scrutiny of the financial services industry spawned much
commentary relevant to double standard issues. A column in the Economist
noted:
Connections also count in the West, of course. Following initial
reports of the SEC’s investigation in the New York Times, a flood of
stories have noted the jobs held in politically sensitive American firms by
the sprogs of American politicians. . . .
If the regulators genuinely fret about why firms make hiring decisions,
they may want to extend their inquiries to Washington, DC, and New
York as well.157

153. Id.
154. Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Probe Expands in Asia, Spreadsheet Found, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-29/jpmorgan-bribeprobe-said-to-expand-in-asia-as-spreadsheet-found [http://perma.cc/YCY9-3ZFJ].
155. See Robin Sidel & Cynthia Koons, U.S. Overseas Hiring Probe Has Wide Net,
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732
4324404579043382418965094 [http://perma.cc/YP8A-HUTK].
156. See Mike Koehler, Wall Street Firms Push Back Against FCPA Scrutiny, FCPA
PROFESSOR (May 5, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/wall-street-firms-push-backagainst-fcpa-scrutiny [http://perma.cc/5M8Q-VX9E].
157. Blood and Money, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21584033-american-regulators-investigate-jpmorgan-chaseshiring-china-blood-and-money [http://perma.cc/4TXV-P4G7].
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A column in the New York Times likewise noted, “[H]iring the sons and
daughters of powerful executives and politicians is hardly just the province
of banks doing business in China: it has been a time-tested practice here in
the United States.”158
Some of the most forceful commentary came from respected former
high-ranking U.S. officials. For instance, former SEC Commissioner
Arthur Levitt penned a column in the Wall Street Journal calling the FCPA
scrutiny of the financial services industry “scurrilous and hypocritical.”159
In pertinent part, Levitt stated:
[A]ccording to financial regulators now looking into the hiring practices
of major U.S. banks and multinationals in China—some of which have
employed members of influential Chinese families—anyone who once
hired me [(Levitt’s father was the New York State Comptroller)] might
have been violating ethical and legal standards. Securities and Exchange
Commission regulators now suggest that such hiring overseas is a form of
untoward influence, akin to bribing foreign officials to win business. The
accusation is scurrilous and hypocritical. If you walk the halls of any
institution in the U.S.—Congress, federal courthouses, large corporations,
the White House, American embassies and even the offices of the SEC—
you are likely to run into friends and family members of powerful and
wealthy people. . . . Whether this is right or wrong, unfair or fair, is not
the point. It is hypocritical of financial regulators to criticize—even
penalize—practices abroad that are commonplace in Washington, New
York and other seats of political and economic power. Were the SEC to
be completely consistent in its approach, it would have to come down
hard on the same practices here in the U.S. And the agency would have a
field day. Members of Congress and the executive branch regularly hire
the children of major donors.160

Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich was equally forceful. In a Huffington
Post column, Reich stated:
[L]et’s get real. How different is bribing China’s “princelings,” as they’re
called there, from Wall Street’s ongoing program of hiring departing U.S.
Treasury officials, presumably in order to grease the wheels of official
Washington? . . . Or, for that matter, how different is what JP Morgan did
in China from Wall Street’s habit of hiring the children of powerful
American politicians?161

Indeed, there are numerous examples of children of powerful American
politicians securing lucrative jobs and other positions. For example,
consider Chelsea Clinton (the only child of former President Bill Clinton
158. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hiring the Well-Connected Isn’t Always a Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/hiring-the-well-connectedisnt-always-a-scandal/?ref=business&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8X5C-839R].
159. Arthur Levitt, ‘Influence Peddling’ Makes the World Go Round, WALL STREET J.
(Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230485810457
9262624243252560?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpinion [http://perma.cc/6Q68-VBQV].
160. Id.
161. Robert Reich, JP Morgan Chase, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, and the
Corruption of America, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
robert-reich/jp-morgan-corrupt-practice-act_b_4410253.html [http://perma.cc/8NX7-PJHT].
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and Hillary Clinton, among other things the former Secretary of State and
current Presidential candidate). Upon graduating from college, Ms. Clinton
worked first at McKinsey & Co., a prestigious management consulting firm,
and thereafter at Avenue Capital Group, a hedge fund run by an individual
close to the Clinton family and a long-time donor to Democrats.162 Next,
Ms. Clinton was appointed a corporate director at IAC/InterActiveCorp, a
media company controlled by an individual who supported both President
Bill Clinton’s and Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns.163 As a
corporate director, Ms. Clinton reportedly was paid $50,000 per year and
the company granted her $250,000 worth of company shares.164 Most
recently, Ms. Clinton (an individual with no apparent professional
journalism experience) was hired as a “special correspondent” at NBC
News and reportedly received an annual salary of $600,000.165
Consider also Jeb Bush (the son of former President George H.W. Bush,
the brother of former President George W. Bush, and also the former
Governor of Florida and current Presidential candidate). As recently
highlighted by the New York Times:
As Mr. Bush sought to create a personal fortune for himself and his
family after eight years in public office, he found a ready source of
income: speeches sponsored by corporations and industry trade groups,
including some that benefited from his administration’s policies.
Since 2007, Mr. Bush has delivered about 260 paid speeches, earning
around $10 million in the process, according to records provided this
week by his presidential campaign. The speeches, combined with his
consulting and investment businesses, rapidly transformed his finances:
His and his wife’s net worth soared to at least $19 million from $1.3
million over the past eight years.
The wealth he amassed from the speaking circuit pales in comparison
to that collected by Hillary Rodham Clinton, a Democratic candidate. But
it underscores the ease with which political figures can turn their public
prominence into private riches.166

Notably, the recent release of Jeb Bush’s tax returns reveals that “[o]ver
about six years as an adviser for the defunct Wall Street bank Lehman Bros.
and later Barclays PLC, Mr. Bush earned, on average, between $1.3 million
and $2 million.”167
162. See Reuters, Chelsea Clinton Joins New York Hedge Fund, NBC (Nov. 3, 2006),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15549672/ns/business-us_business/t/chelsea-clinton-joins-newyork-hedge-fund/#.VaGlEflViko [http://perma.cc/2P3E-RR3P].
163. See Peter Lattman, Chelsea Clinton Joins Board of Diller’s IAC, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
26,
2011),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/chelsea-clinton-joins-board-of-iac
interactive/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8RW6-WWMA].
164. Id.
165. See Sophia Rosenbaum, Chelsea Clinton Is Making Bank at NBC, N.Y. POST (June
13, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/06/13/chelsea-clinton-is-making-bank-at-nbc/ [http://
perma.cc/FB5W-RCFB].
166. Barbaro & Eder, supra note 113.
167. Beth Reinhard, Christopher S. Stewart & Rebecca Ballhaus, Jeb Bush Releases 33
Years of Tax Returns, WALL STREET J. (July 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/jeb-bushreleases-33-years-of-tax-returns-1435698068 [http://perma.cc/7KQB-EWKZ].
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In response to the FCPA scrutiny of the financial services industry
concerning alleged hiring practices of family members of foreign officials,
FCPA practitioners published client alerts and other publications regarding
best practices.168 The following best practices were rightly noted:


“Check the educational and professional qualifications of the
individual being considered for employment and ensure that they
are appropriate for the position being filled. Evidence that a
relative of a government official was hired into a position for
which he or she was not qualified will likely result in a finding
that they were hired for improper purposes.”169



“Ensure that the salary and treatment given to the relative of the
government official is commensurate with the position and
consistent with other individuals in a similar position. Evidence
that the relative of the government official is receiving a salary
significantly higher than other individuals at a similar level and
occupying similar positions suggests the additional funds may be
provided to influence the related government official.”170



“Confirm that the position was not created specifically for the
relative of the government official. Evidence that the position
was created for a specific person will suggest that the company’s
sole purpose in hiring the individual was to gain influence with
the government official.”171



“An individual whose sole qualification for a prestigious Wall
Street gig is a powerful mother or father in the . . . government
should raise red flags.” If an individual “is not otherwise
qualified for the position at [a] financial services company, the
DOJ and SEC will ask about the basis for the hiring.”172

If the above best practices questions were asked in connection with
Chelsea Clinton’s various positions or Jeb Bush’s adviser positions with
Wall Street banks, what would the answers be?

168. See, e.g., RICHARD CRAIG SMITH, PAUL EDWARD SUMILAS & KATE HUNTER, NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT, HIRING A PROBLEM: AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF EMPLOYING RELATIVES OF
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
(2013),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/
publications/104411/hiring-a-problem-avoiding-the-pitfalls-of-employing-relatives-ofgovernment-officials [http://perma.cc/4X8R-CFM2]; Max Stendahl, 5 Tips to Thwart FCPA
Scrutiny of Hiring Practices, LAW360 (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/
469505/5-tips-to-thwart-fcpa-scrutiny-of-hiring-practices [http://perma.cc/84FA-KWAW].
169. Smith et al., supra note 168.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Stendahl, supra note 168.
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In short, there are princelings in the United States as well as individuals
who bounce in and out of politics and “private” life so often that they are
effectively part of the political class regardless of the precise moment in
time in which the question is posed. Returning to former Labor Secretary
Reich’s observations about the FCPA scrutiny of the financial services
industry, Reich asked, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
important . . . and JP Morgan should be nailed for bribing Chinese officials.
But, if you’ll pardon me for asking, why isn’t there a Domestic Corrupt
Practices Act?”173
As highlighted above, there is indeed a “domestic corrupt practices
act”—it is called 18 U.S.C. § 201 and it has similar core elements to the
FCPA. Time will tell whether the industry sweep of Asian hiring practices
of financial services companies results in any FCPA enforcement
actions.174 However, it is safe to assume that there will be no domestic
bribery prosecutions based on similar corporate hiring practices in the
United States.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article was to highlight various case studies and
examples so that readers can decide for themselves whether the U.S.
crusade against bribery suffers from several uncomfortable truths and
double standards. This is not just a legal issue, but also a policy issue that
goes to the heart of the legitimacy and moral authority on which the United
States acts. Indeed, the policy reasons motivating Congress to enact the
FCPA—that corporate payments were subverting the democratic process,
undermining the integrity and stability of government, and eroding public
confidence in basic institutions—apply with equal force to domestic
bribery.
At the very least, the above case studies and examples should cause
readers to pause and reflect on whether the United States is indeed in a
“unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption”175 or on the “right
side of history.”176 Some readers may view merely posing such questions
as provocative.
The truth, however, is that similar questions were asked during the
FCPA’s passage in 1977 as Congress quickly learned that corporate bribery

173. Reich, supra note 161.
174. At present, Bank of New York Mellon has reportedly received a Wells Notice from
the SEC concerning an anticipated enforcement action. See Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-149
[http://perma.cc/P8BM-UTLY]. Even if there is no actual enforcement action, the
companies under investigation have likely spent millions of dollars responding to the U.S.
government investigation and may also have lost hundreds of millions of dollars in potential
business because of excessive risk aversion. See generally Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 391 (2014).
175. See Breuer, supra note 1.
176. Id.
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was not the “simple, safe issue it seem[ed] at first blush.”177 Moreover, the
FCPA’s legislative history teaches that “trying to define exactly what
bribery is is a real problem” and that “in certain instances, we have a gray
area when it comes to this bribery question.”178 The FCPA’s legislative
history further instructs that there will be “countless situations” in which
fair-minded individuals “will be hard-put to determine whether a particular
payment or practice is a legitimate and permissible business activity or a
means of improper influence,”179 and it was further noted that reasonable
persons “and even angels will differ on the answers . . . [and] such
distinctions should make us less sweeping in our judgments and less
confident in our solutions.”180
If anything, the persistent and lingering questions about bribery are more
pressing today given the current U.S. crusade against bribery—or at least
bribery of a certain type. As highlighted in this Article, however,
“corruption is universal, and one has to be very careful when one takes a
very righteous position.”181

177. Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 16, at 2 (citing Theodore C. Sorensen,
Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 719, 719
(1976)).
178. Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 42, at 46 (statement of William Simon,
U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury).
179. Foreign Payments Disclosure, supra note 16, at 2 (citing Sorensen, supra note 177,
at 719).
180. Id.
181. ARUNA VISWANATHA, MAIN JUSTICE, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IRKED BY CORRUPTION
LABEL (2010) (quoting Selim Jahan, Director, Poverty Practice, United Nations
Development Programme) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).

